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INTRODUCTION
The argument advanced here originated as I was explaining to a group
of heterosexual law professor friends that their uncomfortable reactions to my
matter-of-fact talk of sex and sexuality was due, perhaps, to more than just the
residue of garden-variety homophobia.' Their discomfiture, I urged them, was
the result of an internalized heterosexist and Anglo-puritanical norm: sex and
sexuality are regarded as subjects of shame and secrecy.2 Moreover, I argued,
under this norm the expression of nonconforming desire, whether sexual or
social, remains among the most shamed and secreted of domains. My casual
and relatively frank talk, socially projecting a nonconforming sensibility of
desire, transgressed this basic norm.
Yet my friends and others of the sexual majority express their
sexuality socially in a myriad of ways-engagement or wedding rings, couple
or family photographs, lifestyle anecdotes recounted in casual or workplace
conversation, and what-we-did-this-weekend stories, all effectively signal, in
social forms or settings, underling sexualities. Despite sexphobic norms, these
social expressions of heterosexual identity and desire routinely are taken as
unproblematic and permissible. Persons or groups identified with the sexual
majority thus are more prone than the sexual minority to overlook or acquiesce
to the dominant and majoritarian norm of shame, secrecy and allusion; their
heterosexual identity is assumed, experienced and validated in all kinds of
ways. On the other hand, minority identities are pervasively ignored, denied or
attacked.
Thus, within this status quo, heterosexuals do, but need not, assert
(hetero)sexual identity socially in order to claim or establish overt
identification; theirs is the default and privileged category. Lesbians and gays,
on the other hand, must talk proactively and conditionally about sexual identity
not only to rectify casual assumptions to the contrary but also to connect with
I. The term "homophobia" describes an irrational fear of persons or phenomena associated
with same-sex desire. See generally WARREN J. BLUMENFELD, HOMOPHOBIA: How WE ALL PAY THE
PRICE (1992).
2. This norm may be related to Victorian sexphobia. See generally RICHARD DELLAMORA,
MASCULINE DESIRE: THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF VICTORIAN AESTHETICISM (1990); LINDA DOWLING
HELLENISM AND HOMOSEXUALITY IN VICTORIAN OXFORD (1994); HUMPHREYS LAUD, OUT OF THE
CLOSETS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF HOMOSEXUAL LIBERATION (1972). This norm, of course, coexists with
pornography, obscenity and eroticism more generally, and the social attitudes it generates have been
internalized by some lesbians, gays and bisexuals as well. See generally EDWARD EUGENE BASKETT,
ENTRAPPED (1976); LARRY GROSS, CONTESTED CLOSETS: THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF OUTING (1993).
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like-oriented others.' Sex talk, in this context, consequentially has a more
fundamental significance: it is a way of discerning, discovering and actualizing
who we are; it is a key to self development and community formation; it is a
means of expressing our selves, of projecting our ideas regarding the propriety
of same-sex desire. Ultimately, social expression, rather than sexual
expression, of desire is the means through which we communicate our
assessment of and claim to our places in law and society. Therefore, the focus
below is on "public" or social expression of sexual desire, personality, or
identity.
The thesis of this essay is that social expression of sexual personality
is the ultimate target and battleground of legal regulations and cultural
interventions against sexual minorities because social expression of same-sex
desire galvanizes the politics of self and group identification among lesbians
and gay men by challenging the claimed superiority or actual hegemony of
cross-sex desire. As countless "coming out" accounts and other current
phenomena attest, social expression is a way of communicating to one
another-and to the sexual majority-the fact of our existence, and of our self-
esteem. Social expression of sexual desire constitutes both identity, as well as
discourses about identity and identity politics.
The social expression of minority sexual identity thus serves as a key
means of altering the dominant culture's political and legal misconceptions of
lesbians and gays. It is a means of enriching the nation's mix of ideas and
options regarding human sexuality in order to alter the status quo and advance
(in)equality reform. And because social expression of same-sex desire is
constitutive of both individual and collective sexual minority conciousness, its
silencing is integral to the general oppression of sexual minorities. The
suppression of same-sex desire, whether expressed socially or sexually, is
3. I make no claims about bisexual, transgendered or transsexual populations, but suspect
that much of my argument may apply to them as well. For readings on bisexuality and the law, see
generally Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1995)
(discussing group based subordination in society); Ruth Colker, A Bisexual Jurisprudence, 3 LAW &
SEXUALITY 127 (1993) (arguing for the creation and acceptability of bisexual jurisprudence); RUTH
COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1996).
For readings on transgendered and transsexual populations, see generally Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Lmv and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); GORDENE OLGA MACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER NATION (1994);
FRANK LEWINS, TRANSSEXUALISM IN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGY OF MALE TO FEMALE TRANSSEXUALS
(1995); WILLIAM A.W. WALTERS AND MICHAEL W. Ross, TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT
(1986). Nonetheless, my occasional use of the term "sexual minorities" in this essay is inclusive of these
categories. See infra Valdes note 9, at 377 n.16.
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integral to the maintenance of heterosexual and heteropatriarchal supremacy
as authoritative state policy.
Indeed, the cases bear out this dynamic. The courts have approved
state criminalization of same-sex acts of love or lust.4 However, this
criminalization additionally has been interpreted as being and operating as
more than a means of repressing the sexual expression of desire "in private"
between consenting adults.5 The proscription of same-sex sexual expression
also operates as a means of suppressing social expression and knowledge of
sexual minority desire and personality by licensing societal acts of retaliation
or discrimination against those who express same-sex desire socially.6 Hence,
the sexual minority personality is not only left constitutionally unprotected by
the "privacy" doctrine, it is also supposed to stay unseen and unheard in all
respects to keep lesbians and gays socially isolated, economically
disempowered and politically subordinated.
Given this backdrop, I will survey privacy rulings, equality law and
expression jurisprudence to critique the status quo, and to glean from it an
approach to the social expression of sexual desire that is more politically
egalitarian and intellectually honest. This endeavor will allow us to consider
how the devaluation and criminalization of same-sex intimacy and expression
are juridically rationalized via doctrines professedly designed to protect the
individual from state-sanctioned regimentation. At bottom, this discussion will
show how and why the law is crafted to mistreat sexual minority identities and
relations in various kinds of social and legal contexts.
This critique also will reveal the larger hierarchy of values associated
with different kinds of erotic desire, a hierarchy that devalues even dissident
forms of cross-sex expression or intimacy. This discussion can, therefore,
prompt a broader critical review of the hierarchal arrangement of different
desires that valorizes and perpetuates the expression of only a form of eros that
the traditionalist state deems instrumental: cross-sex desire that serves
heteropatriarchal conceptions of family and life. I will make an effort to focus
attention on this phenomenon, and thereby to advance a broader critical
(re)consideration of the social and legal worth of erotic desire.
And so my contribution to this symposium is a few thoughts about sex,
knowledge, expression, power and politics at the end of the twentieth century.
4. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
5. See id.
6. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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With these thoughts, I question why the sexual majority is discomfited by
social manifestations of sexual orientation-that is, "sex talk"--and why
sexual minorities insist on "coming out" of the Closet in "public." In this way,
I will examine the social and legal worth of desire and its social expression
from the position of a gay man.7 From this position, I will seek to focus
attention on the ultimate target of legal regulation of same-sex sexuality-the
social expression of nonconforming desire-which the traditionalist state views
as disruptive of the heteropatriarchal status quo.
Doctrinally, I will first question the "instrumental" model of sexual
regulation that prevails under the Fourteenth Amendment. This model focuses
on "privacy" as if sexuality were experienced or expressed primarily in isolated
settings. This model effectively measures the social or legal value of intimacy
by reference to the interests, preferences or objectives of dominant societal
forces. I will consequently critique the instrumental model as generally and
needlessly suppressive of individual liberty because it sweepingly subordinates
human agency regarding intimate relations to "state interests" or ideology.
As an alternative, I offer the "expressive" model of sexual regulation
grounded in First Amendment values. Chief among these values are self-
actualization and associational opportunity through a relatively deregulated
exchange of ideas and beliefs about human life and love.8 This model will
better protect consensual agency in intimate relations more appropriately for
a heterogenous democracy that supposedly values and respects individual
liberty. It also will constructively promote knowledge of the self by the
individual, by her/his communities, and by society as a whole. Furthermore,
this expressive model brings into the legal regulation of sexuality the added
7. For a different analysis from the subject position of a heterosexual feminist, see Joanna
Calne, In Defense of Desire, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 305 (1992) (advancing a defense of heterosexual sexual
expression, written in response to the work of Catharine MacKinnon). Though different in various
respects, the Calne essay, like this one, "concludes that we can know nothing, least of all ourselves,
without desire." Id. at 307. See also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race and Representation: The Power
of Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REv. 869
(1996) (discussing the construction of desire and heterosexuality from a woman-of-color perspective).
8. Of course, an expressive approach to the regulation of desire does not and cannot lead to
the conclusion that every expression of desire merits the same legal or social treatment. However, a First
Amendment analysis does make clear that the present dismissal of all disfavored desire as worthless is
narrow-minded, simplistic, unjustifiable and overinclusive. What this first step toward a reevaluation
of desire points to is a task too long deferred: a notion of instrumentality that accords to desire the
weight and protection that First Amendment values and principles mandate. An expanded analysis thus
moves us toward making the hard and nuanced decisions that can produce a careful and caring approach
toward the regulation of forms of expression that are integral to the identity and well-being of us all. See
infra notesl21-22 and accompanying text.
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virtue of more closely comporting with the basic ideals of equality, liberty, and
privacy, which historically (and presently) have been attributed to the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Though this alternative model stems from my critique of the
ideological instrumentality that currently underpins constitutional law, my
complaint is not about instrumentality per se. Indeed, the expressive model
offered at the end of this essay retains and also depends on notions of
instrumentality. The difference between the two models is nonetheless
significant, if not fundamental, in the substantive and analytical consequences
that flow from each of the two versions of instrumentality addressed below.
The shift away from "ideological instrumentality" that I urge in this
essay results from a recognition that state enforcement of heteropatriarchy is
not a legitimate end in itself. The structure and measure of "expressive
instrumentality" under the alternative model introduced below thus replaces
state valorization of heteropatriarchal ideology with state facilitation of self
actualization as the end goal of desire's expression and of its regulation via
law. This replacement, in turn, entails judicial recognition and enforcement of
the principle that the maintenance of heteropatriarchy is neither a self-
justifying constitutional value nor a legitimate "state interest" as such. This
recognition is crucial because it effects a major shift in the substantive interests
that the state can assert or pursue through instrumentality.
Finally, two notes on terminology. By "social expression" of same-sex
(or cross-sex) desire I mean the ways in which people or groups express sexual
identity in everyday life. These ways include conversations, displays of
photographs, wearing of commitment rings and other expressive acts by which
people either communicate their, or learn of another's, lesbian or gay identity.
To express or perceive lesbian or gay identity in any of these ways constitutes
the social expression of desire because the identification as "lesbian" or "gay"
is the normative identification of desire itself, the identities "lesbian" and "gay"
effectively name same-sex desire, and they assert the existence and (potential)
operation of this desire to the world. Of course, the social expression of desire
sometimes takes place personally and directly from one person to other(s), and
it sometimes takes place through media. Desire's "social expression" therefore
encompasses more than literal "sex talk"--it encompasses verbal, visual,
printed and physical acts of communication that convey or reveal an underlying
sense of desire.
By "desire" I mean sexual personality. Though sexual personalities are
multifaceted, I use the term specifically to describe the same-sex or cross-sex
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aspect of sexuality. This aspect of personality, whether expressed socially or
sexually, is a representation of desire, of its existence and of its orientation.
Part I will provide a general backdrop to this paper. Part II will show
the role of desire in the creation of knowledge, community and power among
lesbians and gay men. Part III will turn to the current configuration of law with
respect to desire and to the valuation of its social and legal worth under the
Fourteenth Amendment's privacy doctrine. Part IV will continue with a brief
sketch of the history and ideology that the social and legal status quo both
reflect and reinforce. Part V will provide an alternative framework for the
valuation and protection of desire and its social expression. With this forward-
looking ending, my aim is to focus specifically on-and to inspire greater
resistance to-the suppression of sexual minority social expression, thereby
helping to make sexual minority identities increasingly visible as legitimate
cultural practice.
I. PROLOGUE: DESIRE'S SOCIAL EXPRESSION AT THE END OF A CENTURY
My innocuous but transgressive conversation reflects the larger events
across American society regarding lesbians and gay men since the turn of the
last century.9 During this time, lesbians and gay men have established
communities and discourses, which have made us culturally and politically
more visible." This visibility is akin to a collective "coming out" that is
liberating and affirming. It emboldens the sort of talk about one's self and
one's "lifestyle"" that before was tightly sealed in the Closet. This visibility,
9. The history of lesbian and gay communities has been reclaimed in recent years. See, e.g.,
Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex,"
"Gender, " and -Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Lav and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. I, 36 n.86
(1995).
10. The best account of lesbian and gay history during this century in the United States is
JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLrTcs, SEXUAL COMMuNmEs: THE MAKING OFA HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983). In this book, D'Emilio records the emergence of visible
lesbian and gay life in this country, especially in the wake of World War II. In recent years, this visibility
has continued to grow. See, e.g., John J. O'Connor, On TV, a Heightened Gay Presence, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 1994, at C22 (discussing the growing visibility of gay men and lesbians in television
entertainment); Debra Rosenberg, Homophobia, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14, 1994, at 42 (describing the slow
but discernible acknowledgment of lesbian and gay issues in small-town America).
11. Though I have previously critiqued the blanket use of this term to ascribe a uniform and
collective manner of living to all lesbians and gays, I use it here descriptively to signify any given set
of living arrangements. Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the Military: Charting the Frontiers of
Status and Conduct, 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 381,450-56 (1994).
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I believe, is a key site of a continuing and expanding struggle for equality and
dignity among oppressed groups. It effectively brings into question whether the
social expression of lesbian and gay identity could-or should-occupy public
spaces on terms "equal" to the social expression of heterosexual identity.
In juxtaposition to this new-found visibility of lesbian and gay
expression is the insurgency of precepts and practices associated with the
majoritarian norm of secrecy and shame, which generally travel under the
rubric of "traditional morality." This insurgency is seen perhaps most vividly
in the ongoing backlash against "rights" and "government" in American law
and society.'2 It can also be seen in the surge of invocations regarding "family
values" that have occasioned declarations of "cultural war" since the early
1990s. 3 Today's backlashers avowedly seek a restoration of ideological
hegemony to drive lesbian and gay people back into the silence and isolation
of the last century. The politics of backlash effectively, if not explicitly, seek
to reclaim all "public" and "private" space for old-fashioned heteropatriarchy.14
One observation to be drawn from the current social, political and legal
landscape, therefore, is that suppression of all lesbian and gay expression is a
primary objective of the backlash agenda.
12. The notion seems to be that the federal government, and perhaps especially the federal
courts, have generated "too many" rights; hence, the impulse to curtail rights is directed at a curtailment
of federal programs, activity and power. See, e.g., Too Many "Rights, " NEWSDAY, Dec. 15, 1991, at 43
(discussing the danger of misplaced demands weakening our Constitution); Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit
of "We," ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 16, 1994, at GI (stating that too many rights are being claimed
without any responsibility being assumed); Steve Berg, Simmering Preferences Controversy Nears a
Boil, STAR TRIB., Mar. 12, 1995, at IA (describing the backlash against federal affirmative action
programs for minorities).
13. The seminal declaration was issued by Republican presidential aspirant Patrick J.
Buchanan from the podium of the 1992 Republican National Convention, when he proclaimed: 'There
is a religious war going on in our country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war, as critical to the
kind of nation we will one day be as the Cold War itself." Chris Black, Buchanan Beckons
Conservatives To Come Home, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 1992, at A12. The concept of cultural war
most recently was invoked by Justice Scalia in his Romer v. Evans dissent. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct.
1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally JAMES HUNTER, BEFORE THE SHOOTING
BEGINS: SEARCHING FOR DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA'S CULTURE WAR (1994) (describing the conflict of
the religious versus the secularist and calling for moderation before civil war erupts); JAMES HUNTER,
CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991) (coining the phrase culture wars, from
which Buchanan quoted).
14. Heteropatriarchy refers to a blending of androcentrism and heterocentrism to privilege
men and masculinity both sexually and socially. See Valdes, supra note 9, at 8 nn. 12-14.
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This drive is captured by the insidious, albeit casual and familiar,
admonition against "flaunting" lesbian or gay identity. 5 This admonition
effectively communicates that "being" lesbian or gay is tolerable but that
expressing those identities socially exceeds the limits of toleration. More
recently, dominant socio-legal impulses yielded the so-called "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" compromise over the degree of discrimination that the military
would be allowed to practice lawfully against the lesbian and gay population
of this country. 6 This policy endeavors to make invisible the existence of
lesbian and gay personalities by purporting to preserve subjective sensibilities
regarding identity while stripping identity of all indicia or expression; it
bifurcates identity from its social expression. 7 Given its substance and impact,
the goal of backlash is to deprive lesbians and gays of opportunities to connect
and grow.
However, as these examples illustrate, today's suppression is not only
designed to keep lesbian and gay communities disempowered by depriving us
of our sense of individual or collective self, but it also keeps the general
populace in ignorance of us by inhibiting all manifestations-even non-sexual
ones--of sexual minority identities. The arenas of backlash suppression are not
limited to the inhibition of same-sex sexual relations, but to the creation of
ignorance and disdain for any expression of identity or community involving
same-sex desire or affinity. The obvious purpose of suppressing the social
expression of lesbian or gay identity and desire is to deny knowledge and incite
ignorant fear of such persons and desires both to the minority and to the
majority; the goal is the suppression of ideas that challenge dominant
arrangements hinging on the ideological hegemony of heteropatriarchal desire.
In this context, social expressions of desire can be no less than acts of power
while sexual expressions of desire remain no less than crimes of knowledge.
Thus, as this century draws to a close we have been witnessing a
triumph of backlash politics that seek the contraction of all civil rights at
15. One example is the military's current policy; see Jim Hoagland, Colin Powell: This
Debate Is Over, WASH. POST, July27, 1993, at A17.
16. For a more detailed discussion, see Valdes, supra note 11, at 465-74.
17. This distinction permits the assertion of a key conceptual and political fallacy that still
reigns in the law: a distinction between status and conduct, or between desire and behavior. But this
disguise, when identified and scrutinized, cannot entirely occlude the ultimate use of the criminal law
and other cultural apparati to inhibit and distort more than conduct. For a more extended discussion of
status/conduct issues, see Valdes, supra note 11. See also Francisco Valdes, Between and Beyond Race,
Gender and Sexuality: Constructing "Identity" As a Legal Concept in Equality Jurisprudence
(forthcoming).
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precisely the same historical moment as we are experiencing the large-scale
emergence of sexual minority cultures and communities. Could this be
coincidence? Or is the arrival of lesbians, gays and other sexual minorities on
the national scene the proverbial "last straw" that broke the national will and
consensus over issues of (in)equality and discrimination? This timing, I
suggest, is no coincidence: the arrival of lesbians, gays and other sexual
minorties has fueled profound fears that further problematize the larger set of
civil rights that many Americans already wish to diminish or abandon.
Overall, we live in curious times. A "liberal" government perceived
as excessively benevolent to the historically subordinated members of its
society, for the moment, has been repudiated by a "majority" of "angry (and
putatively straight) white men""8 who are set to restore "tradition" through
backlash politics and "cultural war." But the backlashers' version of tradition
and history is not all that linear or simple. The nation and its laws remain
formally committed to the grand ideals that the Constitution embeds in
American social and legal culture. Among these are the express textual
guarantees of equality' 9 and expression.20
Though the principles underlying these guarantees are often violated
in practice, the traditions and histories of the past include formal and
fundamental mandates that provide platforms for progressive agendas, even
amidst backlash. The revitalization of enduring and potentially transformative
constitutional principles or conceptions is an important battle to engage in the
ongoing struggle against all forms of subordination.2' These principles and
conceptions cannot be abandoned to a hostile judiciary reshaped by professedly
majoritarian backlash. Instead, they must be reclaimed and refashioned to
prepare them for the time when the storm of backlash will have subsided.
18. The term encapsulates the segment of society that is deemed to have fueled the electoral
triumph of the "Contract with America" promoted chiefly by Representative Newt Gingrich in the 1992
congressional elections, which produced the first Republican majorities in decades. Inside Politics:
Contract with America Is Top Political Play of the Year (CNN television broadcast, Transcript #727-4,
Dec. 23, 1994). The passage of the anti-immigrant Proposition 187 in California has been associated
with this type of voter sentiment. Jonathan Freedland, The Whitelash Starts Here, GuARDLAN, Jan. 13,
1995, at 24.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. Hence, the importance of coalition work. See generally Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race
in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities and Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. L. REV. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995) (urging coalitional projects and scholarship).
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II. KNOWLEDGE AND POWER: DESIRE IN SELF AND GROUP CONSTRUCTION
The role of desire in self knowledge and group consciousness is the
starting point because it is the ultimate target of cultural and legal interventions
regarding the social expression of sexual desire. Consider for a moment why
the social expression of lesbian or gay identity takes the politics of backlash
and suppression to a visceral and hysterical level. When expressed openly,
lesbian and gay identities are experienced as profoundly threatening by
dominant forces because these identities constitute paths to dissident
knowledge, communication, identification and empowerment. The social
expression of these identities enable self actualization, both individually and
collectively, among those who enact and espouse a view of "family" life and
human relations that the state formally and relentlessly disfavors. This part thus
looks at contemporary phenomena that reflect desire and its role in the
construction of self and group identities among lesbians and gay men.
A. Gay Liberation and the Social Expression of Desire
The significance of desire's social expression to "gay liberation" was
understood by pioneering gay political leader Harvey Milk.' During the 1970s,
Milk placed the act of "coming out" at the very center of his strategy for the
political advancement and legal emancipation of lesbian and gay life in the
United States.' In this way, the social expression and visibility of lesbian and
gay identity became a key theme of individual and collective self
empowerment for sexual minority activists.24
The individual yet communal act of coming out in countless and
continuing ways to make sexual minority identities socially visible was the
linchpin of Milk's anti-subordination vision because he understood the
relationship of desire's social expression to gay liberation in a pervasively
22. See generally RANDY SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
HARVEY MILK (1982).
23. "Harvey was the candidate who talked of the importance of coming out to parents and
friends." Id. at 171.
24. But Milk did not invent this strategy: activists both here and abroad pursued similar
strategies a century ago, making social expression and visibility a foundational strategy and tactic of
sexual minority politics. See Valdes, supra note 9, at 56-71 and sources in accompanying footnotes.
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sexphobic and homophobic society.25 Milk declared, "If a bullet should enter
my brain, let that bullet destroy every closet door. 26 In his "political will," he
called for "every gay lawyer, every gay architect [to] come out, stand up and
let the world know" of our presence.2 7 "Only that way will we start to achieve
our rights," he concluded.2"
The role of social expression in self and group construction is further
evidenced by the migration of lesbians and gay men to San Francisco, Los
Angeles and New York in the years following World War II.29 Time and again,
the autobiographies of sexual minority migrants to these and similar locales
identify the need to escape social isolation and enforced ignorance as the
predicate for sexual minority self knowledge and group development.3" Thus,
25. Milk's insight is further confirmed by the countless coming out stories that since then
have become part of sexual minority culture. See, e.g., THE ORIGINAL COMING OUT STORIES (Julia
Penelope & Susan J. Wolfe eds. 1989). See generally TESTIMONIES: ACOLLECTION OF LESBIAN COMING
OUT STORIES (Sarah Holmes ed., 1988); REVELATIONS: A COLLECTION OF GAY MALE COMING OUT
STORIES (Wayne Curtis ed., 1988). These stories confirm the importance of desire and its social
expression to the advancement of self awareness and actualization, and also to the creation of connection
and community, among and between lesbians, gays and other sexual minorities. Our experience thus is
that the social disclosure and expression of sexual desire is linked to the development of individual
identity and to the formation of collective solidarity. But see Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet
Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV.
561, 602-618 (1997) (questioning the centrality to sexual minority identities of the coming out process,
espeecially among sexual minorities of color or the poor). For sources on the interplay of sexual
orientation, race and ethnicity and gender, see id at 562-563 nn.9 & 12. See also Francisco Valdes,
Mapping New Margins: A Call To Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Lav, Theory and Politics of
"Sexual Orientation" Discrimination, 48 HASTINGS L.J. - (forthcoming 1998).
26. SHILTS, supra note 22, at 372.
27. Id. at 374.
28. Id
29. See generally D'EMILIO, supra note 10, at 23-75 (discussing this migration and its
causes).
30. See, e.g., PAUL MONETrE, BECOMING A MAN: HALF A LIFE STORY (1992) (describing
the author's journey toward self awareness and self acceptance in a social environment marked by
isolation); MARTIN DUBERMAN, CURES: A GAY MAN'S ODYSSEY (1991) (recounting a similar journey
and detailing the role of social institutions in the creation of isolation and ignorance to help suppress self
awareness and self actualization). For accounts of similar issues in lesbian contexts, see JOAN NESTLE,
A RESTRICTED COUNTRY (1987); DEL MARTIN & PHYLLIS LYON, LESBIAN/WOMAN (Twentieth
Anniversary ed. 1991). See generally ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND
LESBIAN EQUAL RIGHTS, 1945-1990 - AN ORAL HISTORY (1992) (providing a series of personal
accounts of these times); DONN TEAL, THE GAY MILITANTS (1971) (providing a history of the post-
Stonewall Riots Gay Liberation Movement of the 1970s, which concentrated its efforts on visibility
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the concentration of lesbians and gay men during this century in urban areas
was driven precisely by the linkage of expression and knowledge to individual
identity and community consciousness-in other words, by the need for an
epistemological environment that facilitated social expression and connection
as routes toward self realization and collective empowerment a.3
Since then, a generation of "Queer" activists and theorists, like Milk,
has sought to empower lesbians and gays culturally and politically. To do so,
they have pursued a strategy of openly expressing sexual desire in social ways
and scenarios.32 Tactics like "kiss ins" and artwork like Robert Mapplethorpe's
explicit photography increasingly charge the social expression of same-sex
desire with a forthright challenge to the hegemony of cross-sex social
expression.33 Indeed, since Milk's time, the politics of lesbian and gay visibility
issues). For a contemporary critique of sexual minority (in)visibility issues, see MICHELANGELO
SIGNORILE, QUEER IN AMERICA: SEX, THE MEDIA AND THE CLOSETS OF POWER (1993).
31. As previously noted, this sort of environment is created through manifold means of
expression and communication, which can include the representation of desire in sexually explicit
materials. Thus, a similar point in the context of gay male pornography is made in Jeffrey G. Sherman,
Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. REv. 661 (1995) (defending gay male
pornography on the grounds that it enables its consumers to realize self-affirming sexual lives despite
a general cultural climate of isolation and denigration). See generally Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics
of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564 (1988)
(positing pornography and its regulation as epistemological struggle); George P. Smith II, Nudity,
Obscenity and Pornography: The Streetcars Named Lust and Desire, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
155 (1988) (cautioning against overzealous governmental regulation of sexual representations in the
name of individual autonomy, expression and development).
32. See generally Valdes, supra note 9, at 346-54 (discussing Queer activism and cultural
and legal studies).
33. For discussion of "kiss ins" see Valdes, supra note 11, at 464; for discussion of
Mapplethorpe and his work, see generally PATRICIA MORRISROE, MAPPLETHORPE: A BIOGRAPHY (1995).
Contemporary sexual minroity legal scholars also have noted the key role of desire and its expression
bothin lesbian and gay identity formation and in sexual majroity perceptions of those identities. See, e.g.,
Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of Essentialism, 2 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 43, 65-67 (1994) (focusing on the subjective discovery of same-sex desire as elemental to
lesbian consciousness); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?: Storytelling, Gender-
Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511, 520
(1992) (focusing on the importance of coming out both to self identification and to social perception).
But see Hutchinson, supra note 25, at 602-18 (arguing that race and ethnicity impact identity formation
and social perceptions in ways that downplay the centrality of sexual orientation among lesbians and
gays of color).
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and empowerment have been based on a recognition that the social or public
expression of same-sex desire is indispensable to sexual minority equality."'
Perhaps the most controversial tactic to emerge in recent years
emanates from a similar recognition of the role that social expression plays in
the creation of self knowledge and community power. The practice known as
"outing" is the public exposure of a Closeted lesbian or gay by another.35
"Outing" is usually performed for the purpose of altering the cultural and
political power relations which devalue and subordinate sexual minority
identities and desires.36 Though "outing" is controversial, it is plain that the
practice of outing springs from a conviction that sexual expressions of same-
sex desire "in private" between consenting adults is but a subaltern way-station
toward the public acceptance and civic legitimacy of sexual minorities.
Each of these phenomena display the link between the social
expression of same-sex desire and the larger contestation over the rights and
roles of sexual minorities in American society. In each instance, the core
dynamic is the linkage between social visibility and civic stature because social
visibility provides the means through which the nation's mix of ideas regarding
34. And these efforts perhaps prompted the California Supreme Court to apprehend this
connection. See Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458 (1979) (holding that
acts such as "coming out" constituted political activity and expression protected under state law). For
a discussion of this case, see Douglas Warner, Homophobia, "Manifest Homosexuals" and Political
Activity: A New Approach to Gay Rights and the "Issue" of Homosexuality, 11 GOLDEN GATE L. REv.
635 (1981).
35. See Mathieu J. Shapiro, Note: When is a Conflict Really a Conflict? Outing and the Law,
36 B.C. L. REv. 587 (1995) (debating the ethics of outing); Barbara Moretti, Outing; Justifiable or
Unwarranted Invasion of Privacy? The Private Facts Tort As a Remedy for Disclosures of Sexual
Orientiation, I1 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 857 (1993) (situating outing in tort law); Jon E. Grant,
Note, "Outing" and Freedom of the Press: Sexual Orientation's Challenge to the Supreme Court's
Categorical Jurisprudence, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 103 (1991) (analyzing outing in constitutional terms).
See also LARRY GROSS, CONTESTED CLOSETS: THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF OUTING (1993) (posing
various questions as to outing in the 1990s); Michelle E. Hammer, Coming Out or Being Dragged?,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 17, 1990, at 50; Jean Latz Griffin, "Closet" Politicians Targeted by Faction of Militant
Gays, CH. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1990, at DI (reporting on the use of outing as a political tactic).
36. See Marsha King, Concerned About Privacy As Well As Hypocrisy. Gays and Lesbians
Debate the Practice of 'Outing':-Hv Far Out?, SEAtTLE TIMES, June 22, 1990, at C1 (describing the
recent trend of "outing" politicians); Afi-Odelia E. Scruggs, "Outing" Becomes Election Strategy, PLAIN
DEALER, Oct. 21, 1996, at 1B (describing one State Representative's experience when political
opponents attempted to "out" him and ruin his political career). See generally WARREN JOHANSSON &
WILLIAM A. PERCY, OUTING: SHATTERING THE CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE (1994) (giving a historical
analysis of outing).
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sexuality can be changed. All of these phenomena, thus, illustrate the role of
desire in self and group construction among lesbians and gay men.
B. Social Expression of Lesbian/Gay Identity and the State
The relationship between sexual minority self knowledge and group
empowerment is not only evidenced by the political theorizing and activism of
Harvey Milk or the personal autobiographies of countless lesbians and gay
men. Awareness, and fear, of this relationship is also present in the most recent
national controversy over the social visibility of sexual minorities. This
controversy, spanning 1992-93, centered on the pledge of then presidential
candidate Bill Clinton to reform the military's anti-gay policies if elected and
on the increasingly clumsy efforts of president-elect and, ultimately, President
Clinton to fulfill that pledge.37 The Clinton pledge eventually produced the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" compromise policy. The policy erects a distinction
between "status" and "conduct" and purports to concern itself only with the
latter."a Thus, under the new policy, lesbian or gay service members are
formally protected from discharge only if they do not "express" their sexual
personalities.
The important point for this essay is that during this controversy all
sides acknowledged the existence of lesbians, gays and other sexual minorities
within the armed forces; the question was never about altering this baseline
reality. Rather, the controversy was about the permissible level of social
visibility. This controversy was resolved by a patent appeal to mutual
disengenuity and dishonesty: "we won't ask, and if you don't tell, we can all
pretend." The gays-in-the-military tempest, as the new policy's moniker
indicates, was about suppressing the social expression of same-sex desire in
order to render us socially invisible. And, by coercing invisibility, the status
quo need not respond to the challenge that we pose to dominant ideas or
imperatives about sexual identities and relations.
Of course, the relationship between desire and sexual minority identity
is a double-edged phenomenon. Though liberational when recognized by
persons or groups to transcend oppression, the role of desire and its expression
37. See David Usbome, Clinton Firm on Lifting Ban on Gays, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 26, 1993,
at 9 (reporting Clinton's commitment to repeal the ban on lesbians and gays); Martin Kasindorf, Gays
in Military: Threat of Dismissal Still Real, NEWSDAY, June 24, 1994, at AI5 (explaining practical effect
of Clinton's policy on gay military personnel).
38. See Valdes, supra note 11, at 465-74.
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in shaping identity also can become a reductionist account of lesbian or gay
personality and life. The coming out stories make clear that desire and its social
expression are integral to the realization and celebration of lesbian and gay
identities, but the rhetoric of backlash makes it obvious that a focus on desire
can threaten to reduce lesbian and gay people to that single dimension of our
personhoods. Indeed, this reductionist approach is at the heart of several courts'
misunderstanding and mistreatment of lesbian or gay litigants.39 The challenge,
then, is to liberate desire without reducing personhood to a single dimension. °
From this discussion, it becomes clear that desire's sexual expression
is not the sole issue in the fight for sexual minority justice. A key site of
struggle is the social manifestations of identities that implicate feared or
disfavored desires. Unregulated social expressions of desire are deemed
dangerous because acts of intimacy remain integral to personal and collective
knowledge. The knowledge sought to be suppressed by the creation of sex
crimes and laws remains culturally and legally forbidden to both sexual
minorities and the majority precisely because of its transformative and
subversive potency. Recognition of this potency in turn leads us to the second
part of this essay: the way in which political and cultural fear of
nonconforming desire, and of its potential for the subversion and
transformation of the status quo, is replicated and reinforced by existing legal
rules and paradigms designed to suppress both social and sexual expression of
nonconforming ideas or relations regarding desire.
Ill. "PRIVACY" AND IDEOLOGY:
SUPPRESSIVE INSTRUMENTALITY AND THE LAW
Given the potential of socially expressed desire to create a sense of self
and group awareness and empowerment, its regulation through the creation and
application of law might be regarded as predictable. Indeed, the body of law
most explicitly concerned with the regulation of desire, the privacy doctrine
under the Fourteenth Amendment, manifests an "instrumental" approach to
sexual personality and expression that is pervaded by heteropatriarchal
39. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that lesbians and gays
as a group are constituted by the common commission of "conduct" that, though unspecified, refers
apparently to "sodomy").
40. As I have urged previously, I see the validation of desire as part of the agenda for Queer
legal theory. See Valdes, supra note 9, at 368.
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ideology, and that is therefore designed to overlook the social and legal worth
of nonconforming desires in sexphobic and homophobic terms.
When I refer to the "instrumental model" of sexual regulation, I thus
mean an approach that conceives and evaluates the social and legal worth of
desire in ideological terms and, specifically, in reference to state interests in
heteropatriarchy.4! ' This model is integral to and evident in the very architecture
and articulation of modem privacy law. A sketch of this suppressively
instrumental approach to desire under extant privacy doctrine thus takes us to
a brief return through five illustrative cases: Griswold v. Connecticut,42
Eisenstadt v. Baird,43 Carey v. Population Services," Hardwick v. Bowers"
and Bowers v. Hardwick.46 In these key cases the courts careened through
various desire scenarios and each time opted for an ideological analysis. While
adjudicating these cases, the Supreme Court thus brought into being a body of
privacy law that is thoroughly suppressive in its sense and measure of
ideological instrumentality.
The first subsection examines privacy doctrine and its ideological
outlook as crafted by the Supreme Court in cases involving the sexual
expression of cross-sex desire. The second reviews the application of that
approach to the sexual expression of same-sex desire. The next subsection
addresses the additional use of privacy doctrine to validate more generally the
41. This instrumental model is inimical not only to same-sex desire and intimacy, but to all
nonconforming desires and relations as measured by dominant lifestyle ideology. The lesson of this
broader experience is that any expression of desire deemed to flout Euro-American heteropatriarchal
preferences is vulnerable to cultural denunciation, legal interdiction and social suppression. For instance,
notions of instrumentality that today reduce same-sex desire and intimacy to criminalizable aspects of
personhood reduced cross-race desire in similar ways but a generation ago. Moreover, the anti-
miscegenation regime not only outlawed the sexual expression of sexual desire, it also suppressed the
visibility of cross-race desire; in other words, the miscegenation regime, like the sodomy regime, feared
both actual intimacy in "private" as well as social expression of the desires that drove such intimacy. See
generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the
Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEo. L.J. 1967 (1989). The "miscegenation analogy" has
been elaborated by Andrew Koppelman in Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy:
Sodomy Law As Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988), and in Andrew Koppelman, Why
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197 (1994).
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
43. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
44. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
45. 760 F.2d 1202 (1Ith Cir. 1985). See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
46. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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suppression of same-sex social expression. Though outcomes vary wildly, the
facts and reasoning of the courts reveal the consistent influence of
heteropatriarchy in American constitutional law.
A. Deregulating the Sexual Expression of Cross-Sex Desire
The right of privacy has experienced a slow and fitful history. 7
However, the present-day principles of privacy jurisprudence are generally
viewed as stemming from the 1960s and 1970s. 48 It was then that the Court
adjudicated a series of cases that congealed into the body of law that today is
under the rubric of "privacy" under the Fourteenth Amendment doctrine.49 It
is this legacy that concerns and confronts us today.
In the first of these rulings, Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme
Court struck down a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives as applied to
a married couple. 0 The statute impermissibly intruded into marital intimacy,
the Court held." The ban on contraceptives was intolerable in this instance, the
Court explained, because marriage "is an association that promotes a way of
life."52 In doing so, the Court interposed its power between a state and its
people, thereby striking a relatively "activist" or "liberal" stance.53 However,
47. See generally DAVID M. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (1979)
(discussing the historical origins of individual privacy and the creation of constitutional protection);
FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM (1992) (relating privacy, social
freedom, and human social nature).
48. For further readings on modem privacy jurisprudence, see Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989); Steven J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold: Foucauldian and
Republican Approaches to Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 861 (1991); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy
Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (1992).
49. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1302 (1988);
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14.26-.30 (1991).
50. 381 U.S. 479.
51. Id. at 485-86.
52. Id at 486.
53. Opinions like Griswold have fueled an ongoing debate over judicial "restraint" and
"activism," which is beyond the scope of this essay. For some readings on the topic, see STEPHEN C.
HALPERN & CHARLES M. LAMB, SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT (1982); STERLING
HARWOOD, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: A RESTRAINED DEFENSE (1996).
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the Court's direct reliance on the marital aspect of the Griswold facts indicates
an ambivalent judicial posture regarding state control of sexual desire and its
sexual expression.
The Court's specific referencing to marriage throughout the opinion, 4
followed by the explicit connection of that institution to "a way of life,""5
squarely situates the Griswold holding in rather conventional perceptions of
ideological instrumentality. In Griswold, the Court substituted its perception
of the instrumental value of the desires being expressed (and policed) for that
of the legislature to invalidate the state's assessment of those desires. Whereas
the state had concluded that the sexual expressions of cross-sex desires had no
instrumental value unless they were at least potentially procreational, the Court
concluded that the expression of marital sexual desire, even if expressed
recreationally, possessed instrumental value because it was part and parcel of
an "association" that represents and "promotes" a particular ideology of
lifestyle.56
The "way of life" so valorized in this reasoning was the living
arrangements formatted by traditional cross-sex marriage, the holy grail of
today's backlash agenda. Griswold's unpacking consequently yields a basic
finding. The state had outlawed contraceptives to protect its interest in
"traditional family" arrangements geared towards procreation.57 In other words,
the state had concluded and decreed that desire expressed with contraception
possessed no instrumental value vis-a-vis "state interests" in sexual expression
and the "way of life" preferred by the state. The Griswold Court did not quarrel
with the state's interest in lifestyle ideology, nor with the substance or slant of
the ideology itself; instead, the Court limited itself to disagreement on the
instrumental value of desire expressed with contraception in light of this
ideology, always staying mindful of the "state interest" in the perpetuation of
heteropatriarchy. The opinion's ideology confirms the state's basic sexual
54. Grisvold, 381 U.S. at 486.
55. Id
56. The Court's opinion attempts to draw a distinction between a "way of life" and "causes"
but many efforts to suppress sexual minority social expression and life are attributed precisely to the
connection between "lifestyle" and moral, religious or cultural causes. See, e.g., supra note 13 and
sources cited therein on cultural war. For an example of such intertwining, see Bruce C. Hafen, The
Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social
Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463 (1983) (defending the superiority of relationships modeled on
heteropatriarchal traditions).
57. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 496.
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heteropatriarchy. The opinion's ideology confirms the state's basic sexual
policy while letting the state know that, in this instance, it had wrongly
measured the heteropatriarchal instrumentality of the desires underlying the
expressions at issue. Griswold, in sum, vindicates instrumentality as measured
by the norms and tenets of heteropatriarchy as the standard by which to assess
legal protection or suppression of desire's expression.
The Court then proceeded to navigate through facts increasingly
attenuated from the ideal and ideology of traditional marriage. In the
subsequent cases, the Court effected a relaxation of heteropatriarchal
instrumentality, while expanding constitutional protection for the sexual
expression of only cross-sex desire. This expansion, though based on a
generous imputation of instrumentality in several instances, was nonetheless,
and somewhat ironically, justified repeatedly on ideologically instrumental
grounds.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended the Griswold holding to
unmarried persons because "rights must be the same for the unmarried and for
married alike.""S The Court declared, "If the right of privacy means anything,
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."59 With this declaration, the
Eisenstadt Court widened the scope of the Griswold reasoning while adhering
substantively to its ideological anchoring. Hence, while expanding Griswold's
protection to recreational expressions of sexual desire in nonmarital (but
apparently cross-sex) couplings, the Court chose to single out "the decision
whether to bear or beget a child" as the touchstone of the law.
In result and rationale Eisenstadt, like Griswold, mixed reform and
tradition. The Court once again substituted its evaluation of instrumentality for
that of the legislature, producing another relatively "liberal" result. But the
reasoning continued to invoke procreation-related activities and interests as a
core standard for measuring the instrumentality of sexual expression. As in
Griswold, this unpacking reveals that the Court upheld "state interests" in
heteropatriarchal lifestyle as the touchstone of constitutional analysis. In
retaining procreation as the basic paradigm and measure of instrumental value,
the Eisenstadt Court not only continued but extended the ambivalence of
58. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
59. Id.
60. Id
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Griswold. Most germane to this discussion, this ambivalence also helped to
embed within modem privacy doctrine the perceived ideological
instrumentality of desire as the basic rationale for judicial supervision of sexual
expression and its regulation by the state.
In Carey v. Population Services, the Court further extended Griswold
to minors." The Court in Carey announced that "the teaching of Griswold is
that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing
from unjustified intrusion by the State."62 These decisions, the Court specified,
included those relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing and education.63 Carey, like Griswold and
Eisenstadt, thus continued to push the privacy envelope beyond the limits of
electoral politics while adopting this version of instrumentality as the basic
approach and rationale of its opinions, therby affirming once again the lifestyle
ideology of heteropatriarchy as the substantive measure of instrumental value.
These opinions established a privacy record that validated (only) the
sexual expression of cross-sex desire. The great advance was judicial
attribution of ideological instrumentality to cross-sex desires expressed in
nonprocreational and even nonmarital couplings.' But this attribution was
accomplished by repeated and specific analogies to traditional marriage, the
ideal of procreation, and the interests or imperatives of heteropatriarchy. What
the Court's modem privacy jurisprudence pried open was the right of those
who experience cross-sex desire to express it more recreationally, namely
beyond the strict confines of traditional marriage and compulsory procreation,
while nonetheless singling out traditional marriage and its perceived analogs
as the "way of life" that the constitution would protect.
Despite its loosening of state strictures over some forms of cross-sex
intimacy, "privacy" thus amounts to the jurisprudence of hegemonic
heteropatriarchy; it is a jurisprudence of ideology, crafted by (apparently)
heterosexual men, that privilege themselves and their preferences regarding
61. Carey, 431 U.S. 678.
62. Id at 687.
63. Id at 685.
64. A caveat is in order: Carey additionally involved the criminalization of promotions or
advertisements featuring contraceptives, and in this sense this case also was about the social or public
expression of sexual desire. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 681 (noting the statute at issue made it criminal for
"anyone, including licensed pharmacists, to advertise or display contraceptives"). However, the opinion
focused on, and has been viewed primarily, as an extension to minors of Griswold's and Eisenstadt's
privacy guarantees.
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makes clear that the state need not accept or celebrate unions other than
traditional marriage. This jurisprudence furthermore signals that the state need
only tolerate sexual desires and expressions that approximate heteropatriarchy.
This impoverished iteration of "privacy" not only leaves unchallenged the
androsexist orthodoxy of patriarchal marriage and its traditions," it also leaves
intact the heterosexist premises and imperatives of that ideological institution.6
This bedrock point is made plain by subsequent juridical choices, where an
explicit halt was declared to privacy law when the men of the 1986 Supreme
Court reached the Rubicon of same-sex desire and its sexual expression.
B. Repressing the Sexual Expression of Same-Sex Desire
The record established with these three opinions sets the stage for the
next step-judicial assessment of state efforts to suppress the sexual expression
of same-sex desire. The prior cases made clear what the bottom-line inquiry
would be: ideological instrumentality. Would the same-sex variety of
nonmarital desire and its expression be viewed as instrumentally valuable?
Given the mixed signals to date, it was plausible to predict either the Eleventh
Circuit's ruling in Hardwick v. Bowers67 or the Supreme Court's ruling in
Bowers v. Hardwick."
In Hardwick, the Eleventh Circuit applied Griswold and its progeny
to invalidate a state sodomy statute in a same-sex context.69 The Eleventh
Circuit's ruling used Griswold, Eisenstadt and Carey as its point of departure,
65. For a classic critique of patriarchy in modem society, see KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL
POLmCS (First Touchstone ed. 1990). See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DIscouRSEs ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
66. For an analysis of the connection between androsexism and heterosexism in traditional
marriage, see Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Lem, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, I L. & SEXUALITY 9
(1991). Current privacy doctrine therefore fails to protect non-traditional heterosexual identities and
relations as well. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The
Limits of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REv. 955 (1991) (discussing how privacy doctrine leaves poor and/or
single mothers vulnerable to ideological regulation and supervision). Cf Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get
What We Askfar: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure
of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535 (1993) (questioning the anti-patriarchal potency
of same-sex marriage).
67. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212 (holding that Georgia's sodomy statute infringed upon
fundamental constitutional rights).
68. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (holding no fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy).
69. Hardivick, 760 F.2d at 1211.
Acts of Power, Crimes of Knowledge
Circuit's ruling used Griswold, Eisenstadt and Carey as its point of departure,
arriving at its conclusion by extending the basic analogy developed in the three
cases.7" In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit's Hardwick ruling followed the
instrumental approach of privacy precedent, concluding that the sexual
expression of same-sex desire is analogous to cross-sex expression because,
"[flor some, the sexual activity in question here serves the same purpose as the
intimacy of marriage."'"
To arrive at this conclusion, however, the Eleventh Circuit's analysis
required another expansion of the substantive instrumentality imparted to
marriage in Griswold. Because both Griswold and Eisenstadt had made clear
that "the intimate associations protected by the Constitution are not limited to
those with a procreative purpose," the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
procreation was not the only benefit of marriage and, further, that the "benefits
of marriage can inure to individuals outside the traditional marital
relationship."72 Among these benefits, the Eleventh Circuit continued, is "the
unsurpassed opportunity for mutual support and self-expression that
[traditional marriage] provides."73 Because for "some" the expression of same-
sex desire is akin to the expression of desire deemed occurring within a
traditional marital relationship, the Eleventh Circuit judged these expressions
instrumentally valuable.7
In Hardwick, the Eleventh Circuit thus continued the judicial practice
of framing privacy analyses to fit the "traditional marital relationship" while
finding that the actual relationship at issue was sufficiently analogous to that
paragon to imbue it with sufficient instrumental value and, therefore, to warrant
constitutional protection from state interdiction. The analytical methodology
remained fundamentally ideological and instrumental. In this way, another
result deemed relatively progressive for its time was supported by a rationale
that exemplified heteropatriarchy. The main innovation of Hardwick was its
daring to imbue same-sex sexual expression with instrumentality analogous to
70. Id. at 1211-12.
71. Id. at 1212.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1211-12.
74. The court also took into account that these desires were being expressed "in private" and
that "the constitutional protection of privacy reaches its height when the state attempts to regulate an
activity in the home." Id. at 1212. For more on the spatial and other aspects of privacy doctrine, see
Thomas, supra note 48, at 1443-50.
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cross-sex sexual expression in light of the "state interests" previously embraced
in Griswold, Eisenstadt and Carey. As the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in
Hardwick demonstrates, the instrumental value of same-sex desire and
intimacy under the Fourteenth Amendment privacy doctrine may be measured
more affirmatively than the Supreme Court chose to do in the next stage of the
litigation, even when ideology is employed as the measure of worth.
In Bowers, the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's
Hardwick ruling." Distinguishing its privacy precedent in expressly
heteropatriarchal and instrumental terms, the Bowers Court thought it "evident
that none of the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance" to the
sexual expression of cross-sex desire.76 More patently, the Court opined that
"[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated."" In short, the
Supreme Court decided that the Eleventh Circuit had over-estimated the
ideological instrumentality of the desire and expression at issue. The limits of
privacy concerns thus coincided with this supreme (re)assessment of social and
legal (non)instrumentality.
With this holding and reasoning, the Bowers Court brought into sharp
relief the dangers that inhered in the Court's earlier use of heteropatriarchal
lifestyle ideology as the substantive measure of instrumentality: not only did
the prior cases adopt an instrumental model or approach to the regulation of
sexual desire and its sexual expression, they also employed a particular
lifestyle ideology as the substantive measure of worth. Taken as a set, the
privacy cases display ajudicial understanding of instrumentality regarding the
sexual expression of only cross-sex desire, even if nonmarital. The deregulation
of cross-sex desire and its sexual expression effected via the prior cases thus
was a matter of degree, not of kind. From this perspective, Bowers may well
be viewed as Griswold's kin, if not progeny.
In sum, the Court sought to elaborate principles of constitutional law
that it experienced and described as "privacy" because they concerned the
sexual expression of sexual desire. That is, the facts involved "bedroom"
activities. The Court repeatedly attributed to privacy doctrine the task of
protecting individual expressions and associations based on sexual desire from
overly zealous state intrusiveness. Nonetheless, the social and legal worth of
75. Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.
76. Id. at 190.
77. Id. at 191.
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desire or its expression was measured by reference to the state's interest in the
ideological regulation of sexualities, with the only real dispute being whether
the state's measure or the Court's measure would prevail. In this way, the
continued dominance of state-sanctioned heteropatriarchal ideology over
"family" relations and desire's expression became the ultimate object of
concern, the only question being whether the state had become too
ideologically aggressive in the promotion or preservation of its preferences.
Moreover, in emphasizing constructs like "family, marriage, or
procreation" as privacy's baseline, the Bowers ruling asserted more than the
social and legal worthlessness of all same-sex desire. This emphasis also
narrows the constitutional protection potentially available to cross-sex desire
when it is judicially deemed attenuated from those baseline constructs.
Bringing privacy full circle, Bowers invites or accommodates not only state
suppression of same-sex desire but state suppression of all dissident desire.
In the end, we are left with a body of law that protects only the desires
that further the state's preference for "traditional" sexual expression and
interaction. Principles and rules of law purportedly the bulwark of individual
liberty and agency over "private" or sexual life now became a vehicle for
harnessing intimacy and containing its expression to state and judicially
approved venues and goals. On its own terms, privacy jurisprudence was
rendered a perverse enterprise because it became a tool for validating a
basically suppressive and ideological constitutional paradigm.
C. Suppressing the Social Expression of Same-Sex Desire
Because these cases involved the "private" expression of desire, they
did not occasion a careful or conscious consideration of the public or social
dimensions of sexual desire. Nonetheless, other courts subsequently have held
that these pronouncements on the sexual expression of desire under privacy law
settled the question of regulating social expression under other fields of
constitutional inquiry, namely, equal protection law; subsequent cases have
held that the lack of instrumental worth attributed to the sexual expression of
same-sex desire in the privacy cases mandated a similar and corresponding lack
of worth in social expression equality cases. Thus, the constitutional analysis
and regulatory treatment of the social expression of desire under equal
protection has been collapsed into the analysis and (mis)treatment of the sexual
expression of desire under the instrumental model of privacy doctrine.
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For example, in Padula v. Webster,7S one of the first appellate
decisions issued after Bowers, the D.C. Circuit held that Bowers' privacy ruling
effectively precluded anything but minimal scrutiny in equal protection cases
which involved sexual minority social identity. The Padula court posited that
"there can hardly be more palpable discrimination against a class than making
the conduct that defines the class criminal." '79 Bowers, in the court's view, had
blessed precisely that state of affairs. Thus, a woman with a lesbian social
identity was denied employment with a federal agency because Bowers had
upheld the criminalization of the sexual expression of same-sex desire.
Federal courts have followed Padula as an example weighing on the
relationship of Bowers' privacy ruling to the social expression of lesbian or gay
identity. For instance, cases like Woodward v. United States,0 Pruitt v.
Cheney' and High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office82
raised similar issues and yielded similar opinions and outcomes. 3 The result
has been that social expression of same-sex desire is deemed valueless under
equality law because its sexual expression was held non-instrumental and thus
criminalizable under privacy doctrine. Consequently, sexual minority social
identity and expression is today devalued, discouraged and suppressed through
a network of judicially permitted discriminatory attitudes and practices that
span the range of everyday life, including employment, housing and benefits.84
As a set, these cases display the dispositive role of heteropatriarchal
ideology in adjudicating the social and legal worth of desire in varied factual
78. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
79. Id. at 103.
80. Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (upholding suppressive
action; gay male identity expressed socially by naval reserve officer through the act of accompanying
a known gay man to a military club).
81. Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding suppressive state action;
lesbian identity expressed socially through a newspaper article identifying U.S. Army Reserve officer
as a lesbian and reporting that she had twice participated in same-sex marriage ceremonies).
82. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990)
(upholding suppressive state action; gay male identity expressed socially by employees of defense
contractors through the act of membership in gay-identified organizations).
83. Many but not all of the post-Bowers cases were litigated in the military context, which
had become a flashpoint due to the intensified homophobia of military policies instituted during the two
Reagan administrations. See generally Valdes supra note 11, at 395-444.
84. See generally Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Lav, 102 HARV.
L. REv. 1508 (1989).
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and doctrinal settings. In each of these cases, the state had decreed that some
aspect of the sexual expression at issue vitiated its ideological instrumentality,
even in traditional marital settings. And in each instance the courts either struck
down or upheld the suppression based expressly on the perceived
instrumentality of the desire under state attack. At all times, therefore, the
constitutional scheme remains tied to the promotion of state-sanctioned
lifestyle ideology, even though the rules applied formally are said to protect the
individual from state regimentation.
IV. POLITICS AND HIERARCHY:
THE HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY OF SUPPRESSION
This jurisprudential history and current doctrinal regime in turn
perpetuate a broader historical and ideological paradigm regarding the
regulation of sexuality. This paradigm is deeply implanted in American society
both temporally and substantively. Historically, the genesis of this status quo
is traceable back to ancient Greek attitudes and practices regarding desire,
power and politics. Ideologically, the substance of existing hierarchies
represents a commingling of Greek androcentrism and Christian heterosexism.
This history and ideology of suppression thus yield politics and hierarchies that
systematize heteropatriarchy. This part therefore sketches this backdrop to
historicize the doctrinal status quo and to highlight its thoroughly ideological
and hierarchical character over time.
A. Ideological Instrumentality in Antiquity
Fear and regulation of desire are endemic today because they are
firmly rooted in history. Euro-American customs and concepts regarding desire
and its regulation may be traced to the ideology of sex/class power relations
established by classical Greece, and by the Greek's use of sexuality to
construct these power hierarchies. In this setting, as in so many others, the
Greeks are the political and cultural antecedents of today's suppressive status
quo.
The ancient Greeks organized society around a quartet of socio-sexual
norms calculated to regulate desire in a manner that would represent and
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reinforce androsexism both in sexual and social relations.85 These were
calculated to channel power and privilege toward the re-production of power
and privilege, already concentrated in the "masculine" men of the citizen
class. 6 The Greeks thus joined sex to politics and enlisted desire in the
infrastructure and maintenance of power hierarchies.
More particularly, there was an "active/passive paradigm" that
accorded to masculine men of the ruling citizen class exclusive prerogatives
over sexual desire and expression and, concomitantly, over social or public
life.87 In both sexual and social relations, this active/passive paradigm
conceptually and materially elevated the male or masculine over the female or
feminine and, hence, men over women. This allocation of privilege employed
androsexist conceptions of sex and gender as the chief imperatives of Greek
power hierarchies.
At the same time, Greek society not only permitted but mandated
certain expressions, both sexual and social, of same-sex desire.8" This aspect
of Greek arrangements, however, was rooted in their notions of ideological
instrumentality. 9 To the Greeks, the regulated expression of same-sex desire
was a key means of transferring power inter-generationally, from older
members of the male citizen class to younger ones."° In this social and sexual
context, cross-sex desires and relations were instrumental to the reproduction
of humans while same-sex desires and relations were instrumental to the re-
production of sex/class consciousness and solidarity.
As this brief description indicates, Greek arrangements were
instrumental in nature, though the ideology of lifestyle differed in several
substantive respects. Most notable among these differences is that Greek
antiquity recognized some instrumental worth in the expression of same-sex
85. For a more detailed account, see Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Heleropatriarchy:
Tracing the Conflation of Sex; Gender and Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
161, 177-79 (1996) (describing classical Greek sex/gender arrangements generally, and the four
antinomies of socio-sexual life specifically).
86. Id
87. Valdes, supra note 85, at 179-80.
88. Id. at 182-96 (describing same-sex arrangements in ancient Greece).
89. Valdes, supra note 85, at 182-88 (identifying the instrumental nature of Greek same-sex
sexuality and its expression).
90. Id at 189-93 (recounting the practices that amounted to a form of institutionalized
homosexuality in the form of Greek paiderastia).
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desire, whereas modem-day Euro-American ideology tolerates no such
recognition. Nonetheless, both the ancient Greeks and the modem Euro-
Americans conceived and approached sexual desire and its expression in
chiefly instrumental terms, as measured by the sex/class/gender ideology of
culturally dominant groups or forces; in other words, as measured by the state
and those in control of its apparati.
This arrangement intensified ideologically in the transition of power
from the pagan Greeks to the Christians, who introduced the glorification of
procreation to existing Greek sex/power ideology. In short, Christian ideology
grafted heterosexism onto Greek androsexism and promoted a righteous sense
of sexphobic asceticism throughout social and sexual life.9 Hence, the
instrumental value of desire and its expression would be measured not only by
reference to androsexist lifestyle ideology but by a more rigid reference to both
androsexist and heterosexist lifestyle imperatives. Over time, this fusion of
Greek and Christian sex/gender ideology paved the way for the rise of Euro-
American heteropatriarchy and its sexphobic, homophobic mindset.92
B. Ideological Instrumentality in Modernity
By the end of the last century, this blending of Greek and Christian
conceptions and traditions had become firmly embedded in western culture as
sexphobic and homophobic Victorian heteropatriarchy.93 Necessarily, the
instrumental value that ancient Greek society had accorded to same-sex desire
had become a censored and hidden feature of history.94 Heteropatriarchal
lifestyle ideology thus was positioned to claim and assert control over the
modernist panacea known as "Science."
At and around the turn of the century, "Sexology" emerged to devise
and classify sexes, genders, and sexualities at roughly the same time that the
Uranian movement coalesced to combat the continuing denigration and
91. Valdes, supra note 85, at 199-202 (summarizing the ideological transition from Greco-
Roman supremacy to Christianity).
92. See FRANcISCO VALDES, QUEERS, SISSIES, DYKES AND TOMBOYS: How LAW AND
SOCIETY (MIs)USE SEX, GENDER AND SEXUALITY (forthcoming, New York University Press, 1998).
93. See Valdes, supra note 9, at 44-45 (summarizing Victorian sex/gender norms).
94. See Valdes, supra note 85, at n.58 (describing the breakthrough publication of Kenneth
Dover's GREEK HOMOSEXUALITY (1978) and the reclamation of this history since then).
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isolation of "inverts" or "homosexuals."9' During this time, the mainstream
efforts of sexology overlapped with the political and theoretical campaigns of
the Uranians to construct new categories of identities that would help explain
the existence of humans with desires and personalities unlike the dominant
lifestyle of the heteropatriarchy. The mission was to create a fit between
nonconforming identities and ideological imperatives.% Thus, both sexology
and the Uranians were preoccupied with theorizing the existence and
expression of desires directed at same-sex rather than cross-sex objects. 97
Both efforts sought to rationalize the perceived anomaly of same-sex
desire within the framework of dominant lifestyle ideology. Sexologists
devised a clinical theory of same-sex desire that created an identity category
labeled as the "invert."9' The invert, sexology posited, was an individual who
for some reason had suffered an "inversion" of gender identity, resulting in,
among other things, the inversion of her or his desires from (correct) cross-sex
objects to (incorrect) same-sex objects." Uranians originated the Third Sex
theory, which posited that inverts were humans with the bodies of one sex but
the psyche of another sex."°° Under this theory, members of the Third Sex
"naturally" directed their desire toward the same sex physically.'"' The purpose
of both theories was accommodation, if not assimilation, of same-sex desire
into the heteropatriarchal framework.
At their base, these efforts confined themselves to the lifestyle
ideology of the status quo, which was based on and gave value to both the
androsexist and heterosexist tenets of the past. In both instances, the
proponents of the various theories candidly acknowledged their purpose as
being the reconciliation of same-sex desire with the heteropatriarchal status
95. See Valdes, supra note 9, at n.150 (recounting the "Uranian" sexual minority movement
and the origins of the term "homosexual").
96. Id. at 68-71 (describing the efforts of both mainstream sexologist's and Uranian
activists).
97. Among sexologists, the direct line of concern was sex and gender, with sexuality as a
component of that larger frame. Among Uranians, sexuality was the direct concern, with sex and gender
as tools of theory and politics. Valdes, supra note 9, at 51-71.
98. However, same-sex desire was not the hallmark of the invert. The invert category
included effeminate but heterosexual men, for instance. See Valdes, supra note 9, at 51.
99. Id. at 51-54.
100. Valdes, supra note 9, at 59-64.
101. Id. at 64.
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quo. 2 Both sexologists and Uranians thus accepted beliefs that valorized
masculinity over femininity, that preached cross-sex couplings as the only or
ideal form of sexual union and that depicted nonconformity to these beliefs as
diseased, tragic or both. 3 These efforts consequently amounted to a modem
justification of the ideology underlying the suppressive instrumentality of
heteropatriarchal state interests. These efforts, in turn, set the tone and
trajectory of lifestyle ideology and politics regarding same-sex desire for the
balance of the century." 4
Though only briefly sketched here, this history and ideology of
suppressive instrumentality has generated a normative and constitutional
framework that today formally permits only one form of desire to be expressed
openly and protected constitutionally: cross-sex desire, especially if deemed
related to or in furtherance of traditional marriage. Rather than promote
individual liberty and dignity over intimate relations as a means of promoting
self knowledge and realization, this history and ideology demand blind
conformity to traditional roles regarding sex, gender and sexuality in order to
satisfy state-sanctioned lifestyle preferences.
For this reason, the basis for the continuing hegemony of traditional
heteropatriarchal arrangements has been exposed as intellectually bankrupt
within a society that formally espouses principles of liberty and equality for
all. 5 Nonetheless, the cases reviewed above clearly show that, as a formal
social and legal framework, suppressive instrumentality anchored to
heteropatriarchal ideology continues to facilitate and protect self actualization
and self knowledge only in severely limited ways. This cramped conception of
instrumental desire, as constructed first by Greek and then by Christian
precepts, is still reflected in and reinforced by the law, as exemplified in
modem privacy doctrine. Thus, the political and hierarchical structure of
suppressive instrumentality continues to reign both socially and legally at the
end of this century.
102. See generally Valdes, supra note 9, at 44-70.
103. Id.
104. Valdes, supra note 9, at 71-110.
105. See generally Barbara J. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family
Benefits Through Litigation, Legislation and Collective Bargaining, 2 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1986);
Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To Meet the Needs of
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEo. L.J. 459 (1990); Evan
Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-
Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567 (1994).
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V. AFFIRMATION:
TOWARD AN EXPRESSIVE MODEL OF SEXUAL REGULATION
Thus far we have seen that the social expression of sexual desire is
integral to self and group knowledge, coalescence and empowerment. We also
have seen that the legal status quo is designed to suppress connection and
expression unless the desire involved is deemed to satisfy state ideology.
Finally, we have seen how this status quo is tied to a larger historical and
political context that over time has institutionalized a bias against acts, persons
or communities that express or connote same-sex desire. Given this
background, an "expressive" model of sexual regulation that is more attentive
to the justice claims of sexual minorities would appear long overdue in a nation
professing adherence to overarching ideals of equality and liberty. The
sweepingly suppressive nature of the instrumental model thus bring us to the
fifth part of this essay: the liberational potential of an expressive model of
sexual regulation.
When I refer to an expressive model of regulation, I mean an approach
that considers the social and legal worth of desire and its expression by
reference to individual and group interests in self actualization through self
expression. Such a model would proceed from the recognition that sexual
desire and its expression both socially and sexually is valuable, if not
indispensable, to self development and community formation. This expressive
model incorporates and projects three principles.
The first is that exploration of desire is critical to self and society. The
second is that expression of sexual identity comprises more than physical
intimate relations. The third is that legal regulation of such expressions should
be measured by reference to individual and group interests in self development
through communication and expression, rather than state ideology. The
recognition and application of these three principles in turn reveals that sexual
identity and its expression implicate First Amendment values more than seems
to be presently appreciated by the courts.
The architecture of First Amendment doctrine generally is kinder to
individual and group interests in self and community because self awareness
or actualization, as well as associational opportunity, are well-established
values and goals under First Amendment law."° Indeed, much of First
Amendment law is concerned with the protection and promotion of expressive
106. See generally JAMES E. LEAHY, THE FiRST AMENDMENT: Two HUNDRED YEARS OF
FREEDOM (1991).
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and associational interests that the state might seek to suppress in the name of
superior "state interests." Thus, as its name suggests, the expressive model is
anchored to First Amendment values, concepts and principles designed to
foster opportunities for expressions and associations that disseminate ideas or
knowledge that challenge the status quo.
The affirming tone and sensibility of First Amendment doctrine
resonates from multiple judicial pronouncements in a rich variety of factual
scenarios on the values and principles that underlie the amendment and the
body of law it has generated. 7 In Kingsley International Pictures v. Regents,0 8
for instance, the Court rejected efforts by a university to ban the showing of a
film depicting adultery in a positive light. The Court stated:
It is contended that the State's action was justified because
the motion picture attractively portrays a relationship which
is contrary to the moral standards, the religious precepts, and
the legal code of its citizenry. This argument misconceives
what it is that the Constitution protects. Its guarantee is not
confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or
shared by (the) majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion
that adultery may sometimes be proper...."
107. See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945) (holding that rights of free
speech "are not confined to any field of human interest" in a case involving the regulation of union
organizers); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972) (holding that "the right of individuals to associate
to further their personal beliefs" protected the formation of a dissident student group at a university);
Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (affirming in commercial
speech that the First Amendment "serves significant societal interests" by ensuring that a "broad range
of information and ideas" is expressed publicly).
An early and landmark exposition of this rationale is Justice Brandeis' influential
concurrence in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927). In that concurrence, Brandeis declared,
"Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men [sic] free
to develop their faculties." Id at 375.
Moreover, First Amendment law also recognizes the nexus between expression and
association. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In this case, the Court explained,
"Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is
undeniably enhanced by group association.... Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to
be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters .... Id at 460.
108. Kingsley Int'l Pictures v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
109. Id. at 688-89. The Kingsley passage could be applied literally to the social expression
of same-sex desire today, with the substitution of "homosexuality" for "adultery."
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Commentators likewise have recognized self knowledge and development
within a proverbial "free marketplace of ideas" as one of the basic values
underlying the First Amendment and the jurisprudence that has evolved from
it.1
°
This expressive approach to the social regulation of sexual desire thus
necessitates honest recognition of a threshold linkage: that same-sex "sex
talk"--the manifestation of minority sexual identities in various conversational
or social ways-is a vehicle for the "expression of ideas" about same-sex
desires and the persons or populations that experience and exchange them.
Both the social and the sexual expression of same-sex desire embody the
fundamental idea that "traditional marriage" is not and should not be the only
"way of life" that law and society permit or protect. This idea is dissident in a
society historically and presently guided by generally sexphobic and
specifically homophobic tenets, which is why a First Amendment-based model
is particularly apt.
This linkage, moreover, requires no leap of faith. The link between
desire's social expression and the role or place within society of persons and
groups defined by same-sex desire is evidenced by the cultural record to date.
As discussed above, "coming out" of the Closet--defying suppression to
express desire socially and openly-has been a hallmark of "gay liberation"
and "queer nationality" for years."' Likewise, recognition of this link was
behind the nation's recent fit over gays in the military, a controversy
effectively about the social visibility of persons associated with same-sex
desire."2 This expressive model thus calls upon the law to recognize and act
upon a link between sexual desire, its social expression and First Amendment
values that our culture already has perceived or documented in numerous other
forms and settings.
As this discussion indicates, an expressive model of sexuality and its
expression necessarily expands the analysis of desire's social regulation
beyond the Fourteenth (or Fifth) and toward the First Amendment. This
110. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Lm: Toward a Moral
Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 62 (1974) (discussing the importance of
autonomous self-determination as a value underlying freedom of expression); CHARLES FpjED, AN
ANATOMY OF VALUES (1970). But see Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND W. 1, 25 (disputing self-fulfillmentlautonomy as a "neutral" or legitimate First
Amendment value).
I ll. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 15-17 & 33-34 and accompanying text.
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expansion would permit us to view the social and legal worth of desire through
a relatively affirming and egalitarian doctrinal lens. However, just as important
is that, by regulating desire in a more egalitarian manner, this expansion also
would help vindicate the basic Fourteenth (and Fifth) Amendment values of
liberty and equality. An expressive model, in other words, additionally would
promote liberty and equality more effectively than the suppressive paradigm
of modem privacy law. 3
Perhaps more important is that this shift also points us in the direction
of recognizing the complex nature of sexual desire because an expressive
model focuses our attention and analysis on the social expression, rather than
limit us to the sexual expression, of desire. Of course, both social and sexual
expression are valuable to self knowledge and group formation. Indeed, it is
impossible to ultimately separate the two."4 Though both types of expression
merit respect and protection, this emphasis on social expression foregrounds
the fact that sexual identity and desire are expressed in continua of ways, both
sexual or private and social or public. This emphasis thus can help cure the
law's specific failure to recognize the particularized and politicized issues
surrounding the social expression of sexual desire." 5
This expansion in turn invites focused discussion of the political
dimensions of sexual desire," 6 which the "privacy" category is rhetorically and
conceptually suited only to obscure. A shift to First Amendment analyses of
113. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
114. This explains the importance of the doctrine of intimate association, which provides
First Amendment protection for sexual expression of desire outside the confines of traditional marriage.
See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). Not
coincidentally, Karst identifies the same or similar values as important to the protection of sexual
expression through the doctrine of intimate association, including "self-identification." Id at 635.
115. As noted at the outset, desire's social expression takes place through manifold means,
ranging from pure speech to symbolic conduct, which the Court has recognized is the case for expression
more generally. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (recognizing expressive
conduct as a form of protected speech); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (recognizing civil rights
litigation as a form of political expression). Constitutional protection of expressive conduct was affirmed
recently in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), the famous "flag buming" case. See generally
William E. Lee, Speaking Without Words: The First Amendment Doctrine of Symbolic Speech and the
Supreme Court, 15 COLUM.-VLAJ.L.&ARTs 495 (1991).
116. In this essay I have focused primarily on "social" rather than "political" expression. The
two, of course, are related, if not indistinct. See generally Janet Halley, The Politics of the Closet:
Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 (1989). See
also Kenneth L. Karst, Religion, Sex; and Politics: Cultural Counterrevolution in Constitutional
Perspective, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 677 (1991).
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desire's social expression allows us to highlight how sexual desire and
expression have multiple cultural and legal meanings. In a polarized society
currently engaged in "cultural war," these meanings include the starkly
political." 7 Events like the recent referenda in Oregon ...and Colorado "9on
social discrimination against minority sexual orientations make undeniable the
"political" nature of sexual desire and its social expression, even when we
conceive of "politics" in the most conventional of current ways."2' The repeated
use of same-sex desire-and specifically of suppressing its social
expression-as a "wedge" strategy during recent electoral campaigns puts the
political and politicized nature of desire's social expression beyond any
doubt.' This move to an expressive model therefore is both intellectually and
politically legitimate.'
Ultimately, the shift to a First Amendment expressive model also
would enable a substantive social celebration of same-sex love because this
shift would set the stage for a freer exchange of ideas about desire and its
diversities. Presently, as mentioned earlier, privacy doctrine is tied to tolerance
117. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
118. See Lisa Keen, Referendums and Rights, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1993, at C3 (describing
the electoral politics in Oregon and elsewhere over sexual minority rights); Death, Lotteries and Taxes
All on PollAgenda, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1992, at 6 (discussing right-wing Christian sponsorship of the
Oregon referendum).
119. See David W. Dunlap, The Gay Rights Ruling in Colorado, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1996,
at A21 (reporting on the ultimate demise of Colorado's Amendment 2); Maralee Schwartz & Kenneth
J. Cooper, ACLU Seeks To Bar Anti-Gay Initiative, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1992, at AI0 (discussing
ACLU strategy to combat the Colorado Amendment); Gay Rights and Colorado Voters, WASH. POST,
Oct. 26, 1995, at A30 (explaining why Colorado's Amendment 2 should fail on equal protection
grounds).
120. See generally Bork, supra note 110 (defining various rights narrowly).
121. See, e.g., "Gay Rights," Public Prayer Are Two of Most Divisive Social Issues, SUN-
SENTINEL, Oct. 14, 1996, at 12A (citing gay rights as a "wedge issue" of the 1996 presidential race);
Tom Teepen, A Family at Odds: Creeping Bias Treats Gays like Poor Relatives, PHOENIX GAZETrE,
July 19, 1994, at B13 (explaining how right-wing candidates attempt to trap their opponents into
appearing to be pro-gay); Elaine Ciulla Kamarck, Nailing Down a Trap-Proof Platform, L.A. TIMES,
July 9, 1992, at B7 (describing Vice President Dan Quayle's use of "family values" as a wedge issue
in the 1992 election).
122. See generally David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy:
First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 319
(1994) (applying a similar analysis, but focused on sexual expression); Thomas Kleven, Free Speech
and the Struggle for Power, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 315 (1992) (noting the reclamation of
expression to power and politics).
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of intimate activities that occur behind closed doors, and then only if they
approximate heteropatriarchal marriage. But such tolerance falls far short of
acceptance or celebration of sexual equality and diversity. In effect, privacy
describes, oftentimes in minimalist terms, the activities that the constitution
requires that the state tolerate, typically because they are taken to occur in
hidden venues. Expression jurisprudence, on the other hand, invites the public
manifestation of dissent and diversity. It can help to elevate the discourse over
desire beyond the defense and toward the praise of same-sex love. The
expressive model therefore is better suited to a public articulation of the
substantive reasons why same-sex desire and unions ought to be affirmatively
accepted and openly celebrated by society as a whole."
In closing, it bears repetition that, of course, this alternative model is
also "instrumental" in some respects. Most notably, an expressive approach to
desire and its social manifestation entails an assessment of desire under First
Amendment values. Thus, some governmental regulation would still be
deemed constitutional. However, this measure of value is relatively positive;
generally speaking, a principled application of First Amendment law would
permit as a legitimate state interest neither the government's promotion of a
particular message regarding "ways of life," nor its suppression of dissident
ideas and expressions, through the coercive power of law.'24 Under the First
Amendment, instrumentality would include the ideals of self development,
associational autonomy and dissemination of alternative ideas, rather than be
trained narrowly on the ideological conventions of heteropatriarchal marital
arrangements. This revaluation of the social and legal value of desire under the
First Amendment can yield a more affirming and less suppressive body of law
because it provides a substantively different measure by which to understand
and protect sexual desire and its social expression.
Finally, it probably is prudent to anticipate and calm foreseeable fears
of sexual anarchy. Therefore, let me hasten to add that this revaluation of desire
under the First Amendment would not mean that every social expression of
every desire has or should be given "equal" worth and constitutional
123. See generally Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin
Revisited, 57 U. Prrr. L. REv. 237 (1996) (discussing defensive strategies based on tolerance versus
proactive strategies based on substantive good).
124. But see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (framing a First Amendment
analysis of a nude dancing ban around state interests in public morality). This case thereby demonstrates
that even an expressive model may be rendered subservient to "state interests" and heteropatriarchal
ideology. For further discussion of this point, see Valdes, supra note 86. See generally David Cole,
Playing by Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143 U. PA. L. REv. I 11 (1994).
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protection, as is the case already with expression generally. Yet, and at the
least, this revaluation would make clear that the current approach to social
expression of sexual desire under privacy doctrine is unjustifiably ideological,
simplistic and suppressive.
Though a definitive articulation of an expressive model is impossible
here, I hope to have made clear through this critique that our regulation of
desire and its social expression requires a more considered, nuanced and
sophisticated analysis, an approach that is operationally designed to produce
a more affirmative socio-legal environment for all. Because the instrumental
status quo is not suited to this reform, the shift to the First Amendment is vital;
the move toward a First Amendment expressive model urged above is
important because it affirms individual agency and group interests in the social
experience, expression and communication of desire. This shift comports to the
basic ideals and values that American law and society profess to hold dear
because it signals a positive concern for, and accommodation of, the diversity
of desire among us.
CONCLUSION
I began this essay with the social and legal worth of desire because I
believe that human development through erotic experience, expression and
connection is the true and ultimate target of social and legal interventions in the
regulation of sexual relations and personality. Though the regulation of
sexuality is often times characterized as the regulation simply of conduct, the
full and elaborate panoply of social and legal pressures (or rewards) regarding
erotic correctness can be explained only if we acknowledge that dominant
forces are interested in more than behavior. This more is desire itself.
Therefore, a focused discourse on desire and on the legal valuation of its social
expression is long overdue.
To help initiate this discourse, I have endeavored in this essay to
decouple existing analyses of the sexual expression of sexual desire from
potential approaches to and analyses of the social expression of sexual desire.
This decoupling shifts the focus of our analysis from "private" acts of intimacy
and toward "public" expressions or dicourses about the social or legal worth
of sexuality and desire. This decoupling is strategic. It is intended to reduce the
existing tendency of legal institutions to declare that careful consideration of
same-sex social expression is foreclosed by privacy rulings condoning the
suppression of same-sex sexual expression.
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At the threshold, this decoupling entails a clearer understanding of
supressive or ideological instrumentality, and of the grip it exercises on judicial
and legislative efforts to regulate both the social and sexual expression of
desire, than is presently the case within legal culture. In short, instrumentality
today is a means of ensuring that "state interests" in lifestyle ideology remain
at the center of privacy analysis. The state interest consistently asserted from
case to case has been enforcing conformity to compulsory heteropatriarchy and
its "moral" imperatives: the state interest is simply the perpetual hegemony of
the "traditional family" as a means toward evermore procreation. Rather than
protect the most vulnerable from state intrusion, the Court's privacy doctrine
aids the suppression of sexual and social expression that is deemed as too far
from heteropatriarchal dictates.
This understanding of instrumentality in Fourteenth Amendment law,
when juxtaposed against First Amendment doctrine, should help prompt a
revaluation of same-sex desire and its social expression. This is because
established First Amendment values recognize the worth of self actualization
and group formation through the social expression of sexual desire. The shift
to the First Amendment therefore switches the doctrinal terrain from the
suppressive status quo associated with privacy to the relatively affirming
sensibilities underlying well-settled expression law. In doing so, this shift also
brings to bear a more affirming and egalitarian sense of expressive
instrumentality to the analysis.
Because an expressive model of regulation still would be grounded in
certain values, the reform urged above would not divest the law of
instrumentality. Nor would this reform "liberate" every expression of any
desire. However, an expressive model grounded in First Amendment values
would replace the excessively suppressive regime of the day with an
affirmative appreciation of desire's contribution to individual and societal
development.
